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Imagine a perverted chess competition during which one of the competitors takes
an iron hammer to every single chess match where, in front of everyone, he hits his
opponent on the hand if the intended move seems to be too smart. If you were a
member of the audience (with purely academic interest) watching this take place,
then you would probably not attempt to thoroughly analyze the actual chess moves
or to reconstruct the match in a chess journal either, and you would frown upon
those who do for their hypocrisy. Doing so presupposes that the result of the match
actually depended on the smartness of the chess moves.
The Rule of Law as a Precondition of Doctrinal-
Conceptual Legal Thinking
In cases where constitutional law is slowly losing its normative force, sophisticated
doctrinal-conceptual systems (Verfassungsdogmatik) may even become ridiculous
and, to some degree, dishonest. While showing a very few examples of doctrinal
absurdities in a judgment of a captured and subservient constitutional court can
be meaningful (also in order to corroborate the claim about its captured nature),
writing a thorough doctrinal analysis on such a judgment is a futile, frustrating and
meaningless exercise (see the podcast by Franz C Mayer on Verfassungsblog on
the Polish Constitutional Court).
A thorough doctrinal analysis can even legitimize the theater of legalism by taking
seriously words which are not worth to be taken seriously. Judicial decisions of
captured courts and doctrinal writings of pro-autocracy academics in these countries
can be viewed as merely performative acts (as opposed to reasons). While they
can be analyzed as empirical material for studying the phenomenon of rule-of-law
erosion, they are unsuitable for use in thorough doctrinal, systematic-conceptual
legal work. Both judicial case-law and doctrinal scholarship feed on coherence, but
autocratic constitutional regimes are by their very nature ad hoc and arbitrary.1)A
terminological remark for conceptual clarity: by autocracy or autocratic I mean in
the present contribution the lack of the rule of law. For the relationship between
democracy and the rule of law during erosion, see in more detail András Jakab,
What Can Constitutional Law Do Against the Erosion of Democracy and the Rule
of Law? On the Interconnectedness of the Protection of Democracy and the Rule of
Law. Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL)
Research Paper No. 2019-15. Available at SSRN (Constitutional Studies 6. 2020.
5-34).
The picture, of course, can be differentiated: certain parts of the legal system can
remain relatively intact (e.g., tort law or company law, which are politically less
relevant), keeping such doctrinal-legal conceptual analyses still meaningful – while
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others (especially constitutional law, or just politically sensitive specific areas of
constitutional law) decline. And the situation can also change from year to year:
when the constitutional takeover has not yet completed, it can be entirely legitimate
to try to halt it by means of thorough doctrinal-conceptual analysis (e.g. in the form
of a commentary, a case-note or an amicus curiae). Once the takeover is complete,
however, the same writings can acquire an unintended legitimizing function. The
frontiers between the two stages are in real life not always clear or become clear
retrospectively (and the question of degree can best be answered with the help
of various rule-of-law indices), but in order to understand the methodological (and
moral) dilemma in its extremity, it is useful to simplify here.
Throughout the legal history of 19th and 20th centuries, doctrinal-conceptual
analysis received ever new boosts whenever the rule of law was extended to a
new area. Judicial review of administrative acts resulted in more sophisticated
doctrinal-conceptual administrative law, and the spread of constitutional courts
(or supreme courts with similar competences) resulted in more sophisticated
Verfassungsdogmatik. The 19th century development of the rule of law in legal reality
enabled analytical jurisprudence (John Austin, Felix Somló) and doctrinal legal
positivism in the area of public law (Paul Laband, Otto Mayer, Edmund Bernatzik,
Ern# Nagy): concentrating on doctrinal-conceptual, instead of contextual analysis
became a meaningful and plausible methodological position. With the currently
ongoing constitutional erosion of the rule of law, we observe changes in the opposite
direction in autocratizing countries. Methodological and theoretical approaches to
law presuppose specific types of legal regimes. Being purely positivist-doctrinalist is
one of the meaningful methodological positions in countries where the rule of law is
in excellent shape; but staying exclusively positivist-doctrinalist when dealing with
the constitutional law of a hybrid regime is autistic and/or cynical.
The Methodological Challenge of Autocratization for
Scholarly Writing
In case of rule-of-law erosion, a key problem is the slow demise of the normative
force of constitutional law, i.e. the gradually growing chasm between constitutional
law and constitutional reality. In such regimes, amendments to formal legal acts
have little to say about what and how things will change. If we do not want to remain
blind to erosion, besides considering the formal rules, we must also examine the de
facto conduct of both officials and citizens, and the narrative accompanying it (the
latter includes the social mentality and the political rhetoric regarding constitutional
institutions). If in our academic work we are interested in describing and explaining
erosion, we should adjust methodologically to the partially non-legal nature of
erosion.
Especially during the advanced stage of autocratization (when the erosion has
already been established many times, both in scholarship and in various reports of
international organizations), it is better to adjust our methods. Traditional doctrinal-
legal analysis will not tell you anything new anyway (except that autocratic regimes
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can be skillful and creative with nasty legal tricks), and you will look like a fool for
taking the pretended legalism of the regime seriously, yet again another time.
Therefore, the currently ongoing autocratization does not simply deliver a new set of
questions for constitutional lawyers, but it also motivates us to rethink the methods
of constitutional scholarship. Purely doctrinal-conceptual analyses are likely to
become less (in certain countries perhaps much less) attractive than before. And
institutionalist analyses combining legal doctrinal-conceptual and social science
methods are likely to gain further popularity in the future.
PS. The dilemmas are somewhat different, if the issue is not simply to understand
and explain autocratization for the scholarly community (wherever you are, maybe
even at a foreign university in a stabile constitutional democracy), but if you have to
teach constitutional law at a university which is geographically located in an actual
autocratizing country. In the latter case, difficult moral and practical choices have to
be made every day, but that should be the topic of another blog entry.
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